Virtue and External Goods

A distinctive feature of the Aristotelian virtue ethical tradition is its insistence on so-called external goods for human flourishing, and perhaps for virtue itself. In Aristotle we find examples of external goods such as wealth, friends, children, political power, beauty, and high birth, although exactly what ought to be counted as an external good cannot be settled independently of understanding what it is. As a first characterization, saying that these goods are external suggests that they are not at all, or not entirely, something that a particular person can secure and maintain for herself – but are, rather, dependent on others and perhaps on luck. Therefore, the theme of external goods is an opening towards issues of vulnerability, dependence, and loss—how these unavoidable aspects of human existence may shape and limit the virtuous agent’s prospects for living well.A distinctive feature of the Aristotelian virtue ethical tradition is its insistence on so-called external goods for human flourishing, and perhaps for virtue itself. In Aristotle we find examples of external goods such as wealth, friends, children, political power, beauty, and high birth, although exactly what ought to be counted as an external good cannot be settled independently of understanding what it is. As a first characterization, saying that these goods are external suggests that they are not at all, or not entirely, something that a particular person can secure and maintain for herself – but are, rather, dependent on others and perhaps on luck. Therefore, the theme of external goods is an opening towards issues of vulnerability, dependence, and loss—how these unavoidable aspects of human existence may shape and limit the virtuous agent’s prospects for living well.

In this workshop, we will explore the theme of external goods through questions such as:  What is an external good, and in what sense it is “external”? What is the relation of dependence between external goods and human flourishing? Are external goods needed for virtue itself? Does virtue in any sense work to secure and preserve the external goods? Should the virtuous person expect to live a full, pleasant, and happy life on account of their virtue? Is a well- functioning society an external good? Specific topics for consideration could be: virtue and loss or grief, virtue under conditions of systemic problems or injustice, and practical wisdom in the face of societal crisis.